Betrayal

The Battle Of Trafalgar

 Part Two - The Seeds of Doubt.

For some months His Majesty’s Government had been active in continental diplomatic circles seeking to rouse Europe’s great powers against Napoleon. In November of 1804, the war seemed to take a turn for the better when a confidential agent of the Russian Tsar arrived in London to negotiate a treaty for a Third Coalition against Napoleon. It was to be an alliance to “establish an international order to preserve peace and the sacred rights of humanity”. But the Russians also imposed a condition. Deeply suspicious of British ambitions in the Mediterranean they were determined to compel the English to demonstrate just how committed they would be to any new alliance. The Royal Navy was to send an expedition of men and ships to Sicily and the Kingdom of Naples (Southern Italy) before the Tsar’s army would commit to joint operations.

The Admiralty knew that such an expedition was extremely difficult. Any mission to the Mediterranean would take the troop convoy past as many as eighty French and Spanish ships of the line. It was true that each of these fleets were blockaded in their ports by English battleships but an ill wind or a vicious storm could sweep the blockades temporarily away, and release the enemy ships to attack the convoy.

But the Russians were uncompromising. For them, it was a question of resolve. How serious were the British? What were they prepared to sacrifice?

Alexander 1, Czar of Russia

William Pitt, the King's first Minister in the British Parliament, did not hesitate. In the face of Russian doubts, he authorised the requisite troops, ships and materiél to be gathered at Portsmouth. The day after a signed draft agreement for an Anglo - Russian alliance was dispatched to St Petersburg, Pitt released a convoy carrying seven thousand troops consisting of 45 transport ships and two battleships and requested that it proceed, with all dispatch, to Malta. It was an act, it was hoped, that would convince the Russians of the sincerity of British intentions.

But these were the days before radar and radio. Neither Pitt nor the Admiralty knew that 9 days before the Combined Fleet had escaped the Mediterranean, passed through the Straits of Gibraltar and was at large, somewhere in the Atlantic.

On April 25^th this momentous news reached England. The Combined Fleets commander, Villeneuve, reinforced by five Spanish and French battleships from Cadiz, had escaped the blockades and was, in all probability, headed for the West Indies. The announcement provoked pandemonium amongst the financiers. The Navy, it was felt in a moment of unreasoning panic, had failed the country. “No-one at the City”, it was reported by the Chronicle “was able to sleep for days”. Two days later the Admiralty drafted instructions that every available ship was to put to sea, as soon as they could be readied. A Flying Squadron, commanded by Vice Admiral Collingwood was to be detached from the fleet guarding the approaches to the English Channel and sail immediately for the Caribbean. 

As for Nelson, commander of His Majesty’s Mediterranean Fleet, “a somewhat erratic young admiral”, according to the First Lord, nothing had been heard from for nearly a month.

But Nelson’s Fleet, sailing between Sicily and Sardinia, was positioned to prevent a feared second French attempt on Egypt or a move by Napoleon to conquer the Two Sicilies. If Sicily fell then it was possible that the Levant (modern-day Syria) would quickly follow. 

Earlier, a small demonstration by Nelson off the Spanish Coast had created ongoing doubt as to the true location of the Mediterranean Fleet. While everyone knew that Nelson could not be in two places at once, rumour and innuendo had left the minds of the French uneasy. 

On the same day shadowing English frigates lost sight of the escaping Combined Fleet, Nelson had been lying in wait off the coast of Sardinia. Had it not been for a lucky accident, (the French ran into merchantmen who warned them of the location of the Mediterranean Fleet) Villeneuve may have met Nelson just as he feared.

It wasn’t until April 4 that Nelson learnt, to his intense disappointment, that the Combined Fleet had indeed escaped Toulon and on April 10 he discovered by chance that Pitt’s special troop convoy was about to leave, or had already left Portsmouth, bound for the Mediterranean. For six days he had been gripped by doubt as to the intentions of Villeneuve but now he feared the worst. Leaving behind him five frigates to guard Sicily he turned and made for Gibraltar. For the next two days, the fleet made only 15 miles towards the west, beating against the wind.

It took nearly a month for Nelson to make Gibraltar, where he stayed only four hours. He was in receipt of orders from the Admiralty, received during his voyage across the Mediterranean, to protect Pitt’s precious troop convoy. He was obsessed by the spectre of an aggressive, rampant, murderous enemy fleet on the hunt.

Now he learnt that the troop convoy was safe, sheltering in Lisbon. However, not all the news was good. On April 9 the English blockading fleet outside of Cadiz had retired to Lagos Bay, after being challenged by the approaching Villeneuve. The British, now unsure of the true whereabouts and intentions of Villeneuve, believed that in Cadiz harbour as many as 10 Spanish battleships still remained, lying fitfully at anchor. In all probability each of them were fully armed and in all respects, ready for sea.

The way to Malta was not yet safe.